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INTRODUCTION
O
VER THE PAST DECADE U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and
George W. Bush have spearheaded efforts, mediated by
key international players, to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Two initiatives to emerge from these dialogues,
the 1993 Israel and PLO: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements, or Oslo Agreement (Oslo), and the 2003
Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Roadmap) have garnered approval
from Israel and the Palestinians and remain significant instruments of
peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Although both accords call for an eventual Israeli withdrawal
from Gaza, it was envisioned as part of a multilateral, negotiated
solution. Israel’s unilateral Disengagement Plan stands in marked
contrast to this backdrop of cooperation, replacing it with non-
negotiable terms and, in effect, an imposed peace. The unilateral
decision to withdraw arguably fails to move the peace process for-
ward, instead threatening the fragile agreements currently in place. 
Although Israel claims that abandoning a negotiated settle-
ment does not violate or prejudice any of its agreements with the
Palestinian Authority (PA),1 this article argues that the unilater-
al Disengagement Plan violates both Oslo and the Roadmap and
that these violations will have significant negative impacts on
the peace process. This article is not an exhaustive study of all
documents and agreements that are relevant to this conflict, but
rather is offered as a legal and textual basis for judging the
Disengagement Plan through the use of two documents that
have served as the bases and starting points for negotiations and
further agreements.
THE ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT PLAN IS
EXPLICITLY UNILATERAL
ISRAEL HAS OCCUPIED THE GAZA STRIP and West Bank territories
since the Six-Day War of 1967.2 Gaza lies between the southern edge
of Israel, the Mediterranean Sea, and Egypt. Approximately 1,377,000
Palestinians reside in Gaza, and until the withdrawal, completed in
September 2005, roughly 5,000 Israeli settlers lived in the territory,
with extensive protection from the Israeli Defense Force (IDF).3 The
Gaza Strip and West Bank together form the essential core territory of
any future state of Palestine. 
In April 2004 Ariel Sharon introduced a plan for withdraw-
ing Israeli forces and settlers from the Gaza Strip (the
Disengagement Plan).4 Despite heavy opposition from his Likud
party, including a non-binding party referendum rejecting the
Disengagement Plan5 and the resignation of former prime minis-
ter and then-finance minister Benjamin Netanyahu,6 Sharon
pressed forward, winning eventual support from his cabinet7 and
the Knesset (the Israeli parliament).8 Another victory was achieved
on June 9, 2005, when the Israeli Supreme Court ruled ten-to-one
that any Israeli laws that might block the plan were inapplicable
because the land was seized during war and is therefore not official-
ly a part of Israel.9 This decision also recognized the role of inter-
national principles and treaties in relation to the Gaza Strip. 
Sharon conceived his Disengagement Plan as an independent
Israeli endeavor and although he attempted to garner more sup-
port by altering his rhetoric to make it less abrasive, the initiative
remained unilateral, with Israel determined to “initiate moves not
dependent on Palestinian cooperation.” The new terminology was
loose, but the overall structure and detail of the plan remained
largely unchanged, and Sharon continued to maintain that there
was no “Palestinian partner with which [Israel] can make progress
in a two-sided peace progress.”10 Due to this conviction, the PA
was not included in decision making or planning.
Upon implementation of the unilateral Disengagement Plan,
Mohammed Dahlan, Civil Affairs Minister of the PA and chairman
of a committee preparing for the end of the Israeli occupation,
noted that there had been a general atmosphere of non-cooperation
surrounding plans for the withdrawal. He stated, “As far as I can see
there has been no cooperation. . . . [W]hen we declared our will-
ingness to [cooperate], Israel backtracked dozens of steps.”11
Despite the unilateral nature of the disengagement, many
Palestinians, including President Mahmoud Abbas, initially wel-
comed the withdrawal. At a February 2005 press briefing Abbas
said, “We are standing on a crossing road in our prolonged march
for independence and ending the occupation, as the withdrawal
from Gaza Strip constitutes a chance for rehabilitating our institu-
tions and realizing our sovereignty.”12
Many in the PA lost faith in the Disengagement Plan once it
was carried out. In October 2005, two months after the withdraw-
al, Abbas again commented on the relationship between the with-
drawal and a solution to the conflict:
Palestinians cannot pursue the Road Map alone.
Implicit in the idea of the Road Map is that Israel and
the Palestinians are partners in the journey to peace . . .
[D]uring Israel’s Gaza disengagement, my government
was asked to ensure that Israel’s evacuation took place
peacefully and without disruption. I am proud to say
that we succeeded: not a single Israeli settler or soldier
was attacked or fired on. We were told that our behavior
would be a “test,” and that if we did our part, Israel
would reciprocate by allowing Gazans to breathe the air
of freedom and begin rebuilding their shattered lives. 
Yet, this has not happened: Gaza’s airport and crossing
point to Egypt remain closed; its waters are off-limits to
our fishermen; its borders are completely sealed and
movement into or out of Gaza is virtually impossible; and
no safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank exists.
Because investors rightly fear that without access to the
outside world, Gazans will not be able to rebuild a func-
tioning economy, they have been slow at investing.13
What remains to be seen is how this withdrawal can now be
incorporated into the existing, and still legally relevant, peace
agreements.
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THE ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT PLAN VIOLATES OSLO
AND THE ROADMAP
OSLO AND THE ROADMAP ARE SIGNIFICANT
PEACE DOCUMENTS
Drafted in 1993 and 2003, respectively, Oslo and the
Roadmap represent relevant peace frameworks agreed to and
signed by both Israel and the PA with the explicit aim of ending
the conflict.14 Although both Israel and the PA have ignored cer-
tain provisions in these agreements, neither has formally rejected
the agreements or their principles, indicating that both parties
should be held accountable to their terms.
The Oslo Accords were finalized in Oslo, Norway, and signed
on September 13, 1993, in a public ceremony in Washington,
D.C. Mahmoud Abbas signed for the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, and Simon Peres signed for Israel.
Oslo laid out a plan for the phased withdrawal of Israeli
troops from Palestinian areas and the creation of the Palestinian
Authority, which would rule for a five-year interim period, during
which permanent status would be negotiated. Interim self-govern-
ment would be granted in stages and the West Bank and Gaza
would be divided into zones under either full Palestinian or Israeli
control or joint Palestinian-Israeli control. Permanent issues, such
as the status of Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements, security, and
final borders were excluded from the Accords and were meant to
be negotiated at the end of the withdrawal. 
Following the Oslo Accords, the two parties also signed
Letters of Mutual Recognition. For the first time Israel conferred
legitimacy on the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian peo-
ple, and the PLO acknowledged Israel’s right to exist.15
International scholars deem the Oslo agreement to be valid and
binding. In his recent article, “Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: The
‘Wall’ Decisions in Legal and Political Context,” Columbus School
of Law Professor Geoffrey Watson argues that Oslo was a legal
agreement, formed by two valid and sovereign entities, and intend-
ed to be binding. Even though Palestine is not a state, it does enjoy
observer status at the United Nations, follows in part the Geneva
Conventions, maintains embassies worldwide, and is formally rec-
ognized by many nations. Watson continues to explain that even if
Oslo is politically dead, which is contrary to the language of the
Disengagement Plan, it is not legally dead. Although a party may
claim material breach as a justification for avoiding obligations,
breach alone does not automatically void an international agree-
ment. According to Professor Watson, neither Israel nor the PA has
taken the necessary steps to void the agreement; therefore, it
remains valid and applicable. 
Ten years after Oslo the Roadmap was developed by “the
Quartet,” a group of multilateral negotiators and mediators con-
sisting of the United States, United Nations, European Union, and
Russia, and presented to the PA on April 30, 2003. The Roadmap
is a performance-based, goal-driven plan with clear phases, time-
lines, benchmarks, and reciprocal obligations to achieve a final and
comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The
Roadmap, which envisioned a comprehensive solution by the end
of 2005, does not, however, have clear criteria for success nor
mechanisms for assessing or enforcing compliance.16
Although both the Israelis and the PA accepted the Roadmap,
they did so with hesitation. Israel made 14 reservations and neither
side has implemented it. The PA has not combated terror effective-
ly, as it was obligated to do, and Israel has failed to comply with
key provisions, such as a freeze on settlement activity. Even so,
Israel has argued that it specifically aims to implement the reforms
enumerated by the Roadmap, reasserting the relevance of the
Roadmap and the role it may continue to play in fostering peace. 
THE DISENGAGEMENT PLAN VIOLATES OSLO
The language of Oslo favors the development of a peace set-
tlement through a process of mutual agreement and negotiation.
Its preamble declares that “[t]he Government of the State of Israel
and the P.L.O [will] . . . strive to achieve [a] . . . peace settlement
and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process.”
Nevertheless, Israel’s Disengagement Plan violates these key tenets,
rejecting a negotiated settlement in favor of a predetermined Israeli
resolution. 
Article V of Oslo specifically invokes negotiation as the
method for resolving what the Disengagement Plan attempts to
solve unilaterally. Article V covers permanent status, stating,
“Negotiations shall cover . . . settlements, security arrangements,
borders . . . and other issues of common interest” (emphasis
added). Although a tentative agreement was reached concerning
the status of Jewish settlements following withdrawal, the with-
drawal itself was not negotiated. As the IDF was withdrawn, and
with the Palestinian security forces still largely in disarray, security
in the region has been jeopardized.17 The withdrawal has similarly
impacted border security because Israel unilaterally determined
what land would be given up and when.
Article XIV of Oslo calls on Israel to withdraw from Gaza, as
laid out in Annex II of the agreement. The Disengagement Plan
violates this provision, however, because Israel failed to negotiate
an agreement with the Palestinians for the Gaza Strip military
withdrawal. Oslo also proposes the “[e]stablishment of a joint
Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for
mutual security purposes.” Because no agreement for such a com-
mittee was reached prior to August 2005, Israel dictated the exclu-
sive terms of the withdrawal. Not only did Israel’s actions contra-
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“The implementation of Israel’s Disengagement Plan proceeded
with widespread international attention and minimal violence, but
unfortunately this does not indicate its ultimate success ...”
vene Oslo’s terms, but they also neglected the spirit of cooperation
and negotiation that permeates the document, which is crucial to
relations between the two parties. Although the Oslo Accords
allow for some level of unilateral action, the document also envi-
sions cooperation and negotiation. Further, this unilateral action is
restricted primarily to coordination with international partners. As
such, Israel’s unilateral Disengagement Plan does not abide by
Oslo’s stipulation for unilateral action, and certainly ignores and
breaches the majority of the conditions set forth for the Gaza with-
drawal. 
Under Oslo any disputes over the agreement or its interpreta-
tion should be resolved by a joint Israeli-Palestinian “Liaison
Committee,”18 composed of members of the two parties, which
will “reach decisions by agreement.”19 In fact, the Palestinians
expected that “all outstanding issues relating to permanent status
[would] be resolved through negotiations.”20 Thus, even if Israel
could classify the Disengagement Plan as an interpretation of Oslo,
there would still be disagreement as to its validity because the Plan
was not assessed by the Liaison Committee prior to implementa-
tion. By moving ahead without consultation with the Palestinians
or the designated mediator, Israel violated the conditions estab-
lished in Oslo. 
THE DISENGAGEMENT PLAN VIOLATES THE ROADMAP
In concordance with Oslo, the Roadmap expressly calls for
cooperation between Israel and the PA and urges each party to take
steps to end the violent conflict in Gaza. The Disengagement Plan,
however, ignores the various external resolutions, plans, and rec-
ommendations sponsored by the Roadmap. Similar to Oslo, the
Roadmap’s preamble states the need for a negotiated settlement
between Israel and the PA. Although it does not stipulate whether
the entire process should be negotiated, the withdrawal from Gaza
represents an important step in the peace process, and one that is
crucial to any ultimate solution. Therefore, it should be inferred
that the Roadmap intended that the withdrawal be “negotiated
between the parties.”21
Phase I of the Roadmap calls on Israel to “end incitement
against Palestinians” and to refrain from “actions undermining the
trust [of the Palestinians].” The Disengagement Plan has created
widespread criticism in the Arab world and is perceived by many as
a ploy to avoid the Roadmap. There are fears that Israel will use this
as an excuse to permanently keep settlements in the West Bank.
Israeli officials have further aggravated circumstances. Ariel
Sharon’s top aide, Dov Weisglass, has been quoted in the interna-
tional press as saying that “[t]he significance of the Disengagement
Plan is the freezing of the peace process, and when you freeze that
process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.”22 The
unilateral actions of Israel in conjunction with such incendiary
statements continue to undermine the Palestinians’ trust in Israel. 
The Roadmap’s Phase II calls for an international conference
among Israel, the PA, the United States, the European Union, the
United Nations (UN), and Russia. Under the Roadmap, this con-
ference should include multilateral engagement on several issues,
such as arms control and the status of refugees in relation to Gaza.
By operating unilaterally through the Disengagement Plan, Israel
ignores its obligations under the Roadmap not only to the
Palestinians, but also to the international community.
Additionally, Phase II calls for continuing the “security coop-
eration” outlined in Phase I. The term “cooperation” again indi-
cates that the Roadmap envisions a process of negotiation, not uni-
lateralism. Further, if Israel does not perform the cooperation
required under Phase I, it makes successful performance of Phase
II impossible. By this reasoning, the Disengagement Plan may
have threatened the Roadmap by calling into question the imple-
mentation of its subsequent phases.
Lastly, Phase III of the Roadmap calls for “[a] final and com-
prehensive permanent status agreement . . . [reached] through a
settlement negotiated between the parties.” Without a negotiated
settlement, the Disengagement Plan unilaterally creates a new sta-
tus for Gaza by changing it from a territory occupied and admin-
istrated by Israel to one that is administered by the PA and closed
off by Israel. Although Phases II and III of the Roadmap have yet
to begin, their success will rely upon a spirit of cooperation and
reasoned negotiation. The unilateralism of the Disengagement
Plan violates the core of these ideals embodied by the Roadmap.
THE DISENGAGEMENT PLAN VIOLATES EXTRINSIC SOURCES
In addition to violating the direct language of the Roadmap,
the Disengagement Plan also violates several sources incorporated
into the Roadmap, including United Nation Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 338, UNSCR 1397, and the Mitchell
Report.23 In disregarding these important instruments, Israel vio-
lates the spirit of cooperation that permeates Oslo and the
Roadmap.
UNSCR 338 calls for “negotiations [to] start between the
parties concerned . . . aimed at establishing a just and durable
peace.” The resolution suggests that the UN prefers negotiations
regarding decisions such as the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
Although not speaking specifically about the Disengagement Plan,
Terje Roed-Larsen, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace
Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, sup-
ported this view, stating, “initiatives cannot substitute for the offi-
cials of the parties negotiating.”24 Speaking at the same event,
Kieran Prendergast, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs,
favored a similar position, declaring, “unilateral acts by the
Government of Israel are not only inconsistent with its obligations
under the Roadmap, but also in complete contravention of the
spirit of that document.”25 Similarly, UNSCR 1397 calls for
“resuming negotiations on a political settlement.” Although the
UN does not specify the content of these negotiations, the concept
of negotiation is nevertheless recognized as a crucial tool for solv-
ing the conflict. 
The April 2001 Mitchell Report specified that the recommen-
dations it made, which are replete with calls for negotiations and
cooperation, should be implemented by both parties to the agree-
ment.26 Primarily, the report called on the parties to rebuild confi-
dence by “work[ing] together . . . implement[ing] additional con-
fidence building measures” and resuming negotiations.27 Four
years later, the Disengagement Plan clearly contravenes these earli-
er calls for negotiations.
THE UNILATERAL QUALITIES OF THE
DISENGAGEMENT PLAN WILL ADVERSELY IMPACT
THE OVERALL PEACE PROCESS
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ISRAEL’S DISENGAGEMENT Plan pro-
ceeded with widespread international attention and minimal vio-
lence, but unfortunately this does not indicate its ultimate success,
nor does it bode well for a long-term positive impact on the peace
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process. The effects of the Disengagement Plan on long-term peace
objectives must not be understated. Israel’s unilateral action could
potentially destroy the viability of brokered peace accords, discred-
it the anticipated reforms of Palestinian President Abbas, and dis-
rupt any remaining trust between the two parties. As the drafters
of the Mitchell Report suggest, none of the steps in the peace
process “will long be sustained absent a return to serious negotia-
tions.” They continue, “[I]n order to provide an effective political
context for practical cooperation between the parties, negotiations
must not be unreasonably deferred and they must, in our view,
manifest a spirit of compromise, reconciliation and partnership.”
This sentiment reinforces the crucial role that cooperation must
play in establishing peace between these two parties. The
Disengagement Plan stands in sharp contrast to this international-
ly recognized objective.
CONCLUSION
RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, both
Oslo and the Roadmap contain provisions for a negotiated withdraw-
al from Gaza. Given the long history of conflict followed by attempt-
ed multilateral solutions, neither Israel nor the PA should deviate from
the efforts of mutual agreement, cooperation, and negotiation. Israel’s
substitution of a unilateral plan for disengagement brings to the fore a
number of issues that still require negotiation, including final borders,
control of ports, economic development, return of refugees, and the
environment. The timeframe for the Roadmap, originally due to be
fully in force by the end of 2005, must also be revisited. Now that the
unilateral withdrawal is complete, the parties must work to salvage
past agreements and incorporate the withdrawal into the principles
embodied in Oslo and the Roadmap. 
Despite recent reforms in Palestinian politics, and promises
and attempts to reign in the official security forces and independ-
ent militias, Israel did not abandon the unilateral nature of its
Disengagement Plan to engage in further discussion and negotia-
tion. This unilateral action sets a dangerous precedent because it
suggests that both parties may now look first to unilateral actions,
rather than cooperation, to resolve pending disputes. Although
disengagement and withdrawal may move the peace process for-
ward, they are only effective if undertaken through cooperation
and negotiation. A unilateral action by one party does not satisfy
notions of fair compromise and just agreement, and does not ulti-
mately pave the way for a smooth transition to peace. HRB
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